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GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN THE
PHILIPPINES: CAN EXISTING BIOSAFETY
REGULATIONS ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT?
Christina L. Richmond†
Abstract: Global concern persists about the use of genetically modified crops
(“GM crops”). This concern originates from the divergent perspectives of nations with a
stake in either the production or consumption of GM crops. Proponents of GM crops in
developing countries claim that the crops could increase food supply by improving plant
resistance to pesticides, thereby alleviating the need for farmers to purchase chemicals
that are frequently expensive or unavailable. However, many organizations and countries
are hesitant or outright opposed to GM crops, particularly regarding their potentially
undesirable ecological and agricultural consequences.
As one of the first Asian nations to approve and commercialize a GM crop, the
Philippines serves as a useful case study for evaluating a developing nation’s strategy for
regulating the environmental impacts of agricultural biotechnology in the face of
international pressures. Though among the first of the Asian nations to enact biosafety
regulations, the Philippines’ existing regulations do not adequately protect the
environment because they lack enforcement power and leave gaps in coverage.
Legislation that would create a more streamlined regulatory process and endow the
regulating agencies with stronger enforcement authority should be enacted.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The application of biotechnology to agricultural crops, a development
known as “agro-biotechnology,” has been promoted as an innovative
advance in the worldwide endeavor to improve food security.1 It has
simultaneously been criticized for its potential to bring about significant
disruption to the environment.2 A genetically modified (“GM”) crop3
contains a gene from a different species that gives the crop new traits such as

†

The author would like to thank Professor Sean O’Connor as well as the editors of the Pacific Rim
Law & Policy Journal for their guidance, suggestions, and assistance in the development of this Comment.
1
See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Policy Issues in Int’l Trade and
Commodities Study Series No. 29, International Trade in GMO and GM Products: National and
Multilateral Legal Frameworks, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/30, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.41
(2005) (prepared by Simonetta Zarrilli) [hereinafter UNCTAD GMO Trade Study].
2
See, e.g., Miguel A. Altieri, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture: The Myths, Environmental Risks,
and Alternatives 35-43 (2004).
3
Such crops are referred to as GM crops, GE crops, transgenic crops, biotech crops, or simply
genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”). All terms refer to the concept in which a crop had been
modified through biotechnological processes to contain a gene that confers new characteristics. This
Comment will use the descriptor “GM crop.”
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resistance to certain insects or herbicides, increased drought tolerance,4 or
enhanced nutritional value.5 Supporters of agro-biotechnology argue that it
could reduce the amounts of pesticide, fertilizer, and water needed to
produce foods, potentially leading to greater crop yields and improvements
in food security.6 Critics of the technology warn of potential dangers,
including threats to the ecosystems in which GM crops are introduced,
decreased genetic biodiversity of crops, and unknown effects to humans
from consuming GM foods.7
The environmental dangers from releasing GM crops have captured
the world community’s attention. In particular, scientists and community
organizations have been concerned that engineered genes8 could escape into
the environment and be incorporated into the genomes of their wild
relatives9 through “outcrossing.”10 The impacts of such incorporation could
lead to the inadvertent evolution of new strains of viruses or pathogenic
bacteria, as well as the development of herbicide-resistant “superweeds” and
insecticide-resistant “superbugs.” 11 A separate threat to the environment is
the possibility that genetic engineering may lead to genetically uniform crop
systems (monocultures),12 a danger because intra-species genetic diversity is
important in agriculture.13
Asia is poised to play a crucial role in determining how widely GM
crops will be accepted on an international scale.14 As a region, Asia is home
4
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TWENTY QUESTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS,
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/20questions/en/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter WHO].
5
Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of
Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2171 (2004).
6
See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 47, 55
(2001); Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade and
the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 175 (2005).
7
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 56-59; ALTIERI, supra note 2, at ix, 27-33.
8
Engineered genes are also known as transgenes.
9
Norman C. Ellstrand, Dangerous Liaisons? When Cultivated Plants Mate With Their Wild
Relatives 171 (2003).
10
See WHO, supra note 4.
11
Murphy, supra note 6, at 59.
12
Id. One of the most significant dangers of monocultures is that the crops lack the “necessary
ecological defense mechanisms” to successfully fight off pests. Consequently, in order to grow the crop,
farmers must add agrichemical inputs. ALTIERI, supra note 2, at xi-xii.
13
Clive Stannard et al., Agricultural Biological Diversity for Food Security: Shaping International
Initiatives to Help Agriculture and the Environment, 48 HOW. L. J. 397, 403-04 (2004).
14
See, e.g., Mark McCord, Opinion, Asia Heads Toward Use of GMO Foods Despite Activist
Protests, THE MANILA TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004; John Feffer, Asia Holds the Key to the Future of GM Food,
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, Dec. 2, 2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4956 (asserting that Asia
“holds the key to the future of GM food,” and analogizing that if the decision whether to use GM crops
were an election, then Asia would be the swing state between the United States and the European Union).
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to many developing countries struggling to feed their populations.15 Asia
also currently contains the world’s largest consumer base, is home to the
greatest number of farmers,16 and is a net grain importer.17 These factors
combine to create high potential for Asia both as a consumer market18 and as
a potential agricultural production area. Many Asian countries have also
been particularly active in developing and using agro-biotechnology.19
Within Asia, the Philippines is on the front lines of the agrobiotechnology movement and was one of the first Asian countries to endorse
commercialization of GM crops.20 The Philippines has embraced agrobiotechnology as one method to improve national food security.21 In 2004,
the Philippines grew 0.1 million hectares of GM crops.22 The International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications classifies the
Philippines as one of fourteen “biotech mega-countries,” which are countries
that grow 50,000 hectares or more of GM crops annually.23 The Philippine
population, estimated at 85 million in 2005, is growing rapidly at a rate of
2.4 % annually.24 This population growth, in combination with the shrinking
area available for farming,25 has led the Philippines to be a net importer of

15

McCord, supra note 14.
Feffer, supra note 14.
Sambit Mohanty, Opinion, Asian Nations May Have To Be Cautious About GMO Rice, MANILA
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004.
18
See McCord, supra note 14.
19
Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: New Legal Issues in the Biotechnology Policy Debate, 17
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2005).
20
In December 2002, the Philippines approved Monsanto’s application for the commercialization of
“Bt corn,” which is corn that has been engineered to include genetic material of the Bacillus thuringiensis
bacteria. The result is corn that resists the Asiatic corn borer, an insect pest. See DEP’T OF AGRIC., GMA
CORN PROGRAM, BT CORN . . . WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, FACT SHEET (May 2003), available at
http://www.da.gov.ph/cornprogram/profile/BtCorn/btcorn.html; see also Roderick T. de la Cruz, UNCTAD
Calls on RP, Other Countries to Balance Impact of GMO, MANILA STANDARD TODAY, May 17, 2005,
http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=business06_may17_2005.
21
See DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, SERIES OF 2002, pmbl. (Apr. 3, 2002),
available at http://www.da.gov.ph/agrilaws/AO2002/AO_08.html [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 8] (“WHEREAS, on July 16, 2001 Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the
Policy Statement on Modern Biotechnology, reiterating the government policy of promoting the safe and
responsible use of modern biotechnology and its products as one of several means to achieve and sustain
food security, equitable access to health services, sustainable and safe environment and industry
development . . . .”).
22
Clive James, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications [ISAAA],
ISAAA Briefs No. 32, Preview: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2004, Executive
Summary, at 4, available at http://www.isaaa.org (follow hyperlink “ISAAA Briefs 34-2005: Global Status
of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2005”).
23
Id.
24
Perfecto G. Corpuz U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Service, Global Agric. Info. Network Report, Philippines
Biotechnology Annual 2005 (Jul. 25, 2005), http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200506/146130020.pdf.
25
Id.
16
17
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grains.26 Adding to the country’s food supply challenges, the average
Filipino spent about 54% of his or her income on food as of 2002.27 Faced
with these facts, the government supports agro-biotechnology as a method to
improve Philippine agricultural productivity.28
As a heavily agrarian developing nation embracing agrobiotechnology, the Philippines serves as a useful case study of the challenges
developing nations must address when regulating agro-biotechnology. The
Philippine government encourages the use of biotechnology in a manner that
enhances the “integrity of the environment” and prevents or reduces risks to
biological diversity and human health.29 Accordingly, it has developed
administrative measures regulating the field release of GM crops. This
Comment will focus on the environmental impacts of agro-biotechnology, a
field whose domain intersects with technology, development, food security,
environmental protection, and international trade agreements.
The Philippine regulations that seek to protect the nation’s ecosystems
and agricultural resources from the dangers associated with GM crops lack
enforcement mechanisms, but could be improved by strengthening
compliance requirements and implementing a centralized authority to avoid
regulatory gaps.30 Part II of this Comment details the potential harms posed
by releasing GM crops into the environment and how regulation of agrobiotechnology implicates international obligations. Part III describes
international and Philippine regulatory schemes regarding the release of GM
crops into the environment. Part IV critiques the enforcement and
compliance mechanisms in Philippine biosafety regulations, and contrasts
them with both Australia’s more robust enforcement regulatory scheme and
the gap-ridden United States biotechnology regulatory framework. Part V
argues that the Philippines should enact congressional legislation creating a
more streamlined, centralized regulatory process and providing the
26
Food and Agriculture Organization, Food and Agriculture Indicators: Philippines, FAOSTAT,
World Bank—World Development Indicators (July 2004), http://www.fao.org/es/ess/compendium_2004/
pdf/ESS_PHI.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Food and Agriculture Indicators].
27
Augusto de Leon et al., The Cost Implications of GM Food Labeling in the Philippines: A
Socioeconomic Impact Study Conducted for the Bureau of Food and Drugs, Feb. 2004, at 80 (on file with
The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
28
See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, supra note 21; Press Release, Office of the President,
Republic of the Philippines, Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for Legislation on Biotechnology (May 7, 2005),
http://www.op.gov.ph/news.asp?newsid=9149 [hereinafter Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for Legislation on
Biotechnology].
29
See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 8, supra note 21, pmbl.; accord Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for
Legislation on Biotechnology, supra note 28.
30
Issues of labeling and the safety of GM foods as consumables for humans and animals are beyond
the scope of this paper. For a study of GM food labeling in the Philippines, see de Leon et al., supra note
27, at 10-11.
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regulating agencies with stronger enforcement authority. Such legislation
would bring the Philippines into compliance with the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety,31 which the Philippine Congress need not formally ratify, as the
factors for and against doing so balance each other out.
II.

CRITICS OF GM CROPS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF FIELD RELEASE

Groups opposed to GM crops cite the potential for harm to the
environment as one reason not to cultivate GM crops in fields.32 GM crops
also present developing countries with complicated international trade
challenges.33
A.

Field Release of GM Crops Triggers Environmental Concerns

Cultivation of GM crops poses risks to the environment.34 One
prominent risk is “gene flow,” which is the possibility that the engineered
genes (“transgenes”) from GM crops might escape and be incorporated into
wild populations.35 Gene flow is a natural part of evolution and occurs with
conventional crops36 as well as engineered crops. However, in the
biotechnology realm, gene flow refers to the possibility that GM crops will
hybridize with their wild relatives, resulting in the transfer of the transgenes
from the GM crops to their wild counterparts.37 For this reason, GM
organisms have been identified as a potential vector through which “foreign
and potentially invasive genes may be introduced into a new environment.”38
31
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39
I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
32
The prospect of detriment to the environment is only one of numerous reasons critics of GM crops
oppose agro-biotechnology. However, this Comment focuses on the regulations governing the
environmental impacts of growing GM crops in the field.
33
UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 2.
34
National Research Council of the National Academies, Biological Confinement of Genetically
Engineered Organisms 48-49 (2004) [hereinafter National Research Council].
35
Michael P. Healy, Information Based Regulation and International Trade in Genetically Modified
Agricultural Products: An Evaluation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
205, 210-12 (2002).
36
See ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 15-18.
37
ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172.
38
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 10, International
Law of Relevance to Plant Genetic Resources: A Practical View for Scientists and Other Professionals
Working with Plant Genetic Resources 68 (2004) (Susan Bragdon, ed.), available at
http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/publications/pubfile.asp?ID_PUB=937 [hereinafter IPGRI]. It should also be
noted that the rationale for treating GM crops differently stems from the recognition that, while some
biotechnological processes can bring about genome changes that could have occurred through natural
mutations or directed breeding but actually occur in one generation rather than hundreds (e.g., improved
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There are four specific environmental dangers that gene flow may
produce.39 First, transgenes might confer a competitive benefit to the GM
crop species’ wild relatives, leading to the evolution of “superweeds” that
have the potential to disrupt natural ecosystems.40 For example, if a
transgene that confers pest or herbicide resistance is incorporated into a
weedy relative of the GM crop, then the transgene would contribute to the
evolution of increased weediness.41 Second, the possibility exists that
hybridization between GM crops and their wild relatives will increase the
risk of extinction among the wild relatives.42 Third, the genetic diversity of
wild populations may be harmed.43 Finally, the introduction of genetically
engineered genes could be considered “genetic pollution” of natural
ecosystem diversity.44 Many of these possible effects of gene flow apply for
conventionally cultivated agricultural crops,45 but the risks from genetic
movement have become more pronounced because agro-biotechnology
introduces genes that otherwise would not exist in plants.
Other environmental concerns about GM crops are the potential for
the transgene’s product to affect other organisms in the ecosystem (e.g.,
genetically engineered pesticides that harm non-target insects);46 increased
use of chemicals in agriculture;47 and the possibility that targeted pests and
pathogens will evolve resistance to pesticides or diseases.48 A final danger is
“genetic erosion,” a situation where farmers’ reliance on GM crops results in
reduced diversity in the gene pool for that species.49 This occurs when the
ecosystem changes in response to the GM organisms or when farmers limit
the range of crops they grow.50

yield or drought-resistance), there are other applications of biotechnology that never could have occurred
naturally (e.g., resistance to a specific commercial pesticide).
39
ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172.
40
Id.
41
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49.
42
ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49-50.
43
ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49-50.
44
ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172.
45
See David J. Schnier, Genetically Modified Organisms & the Cartagena Protocol, 12 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 377, 395 (2001); ELLSTRAND, supra note 9, at 172.
46
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49.
47
WHO, supra note 4.
48
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 49.
49
Healy, supra note 35, at 211-12.
50
Id.; see also ALTIERI, supra note 2, at 36.
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GM Crops Present Developing Countries with International Trade
Dilemmas

Developing nations face difficult choices in setting policy regarding
GM crops because of their position on the international scene.51 Given the
ease with which plant materials can cross national boundaries—the common
example being air-borne pollen—international agreements about the
movement of plant materials are highly relevant to national decisions about
the regulation of agro-biotechnology.
While developed nations create agro-biotechnology policies based on
domestic concerns (e.g., labeling for GM products stemming from a
purported “right to know”), developing nations may feel pressure to
establish “national regulatory schemes based on the requests and
expectations of their main trade partners.”52 Critics of GM crops assert that
weak regulatory systems in developing nations allow international
agribusinesses to promote agro-biotechnology without regard for its
impacts.53 Within Asia, critics of the agro-biotech industry claim that, in
general, governments acquiesce to pressure from GM crop exporters despite
significant popular opposition.54
Developing nations may also be caught in the middle when their
trading partners have divergent policies regarding agro-biotechnology.55 For
example, major GM crop exporters, such as the United States, Canada, and
Argentina, have authorized most GM products for production and
consumption.56 In contrast, many European Union countries have adopted a
“no risk” approach to regulating GM products and impose strict import
measures that guarantee importing countries maintain a high level of health
and environmental protection.57 Countries that trade with both the United
States and the European Union will be forced to alienate one or the other.

51

UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at iii.
53
McCord, supra note 14.
54
GRAIN, Whither Biosafety?: In These Days of Monsanto Laws, Hope for Real Biosafety Lies at
the Grassroots, AGAINST THE GRAIN (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=9.
55
See UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 7.
56
Id. at 4.
57
Id. at 7.
52
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POSES

UNIQUE

International governmental organizations and individual nations face
unique challenges when determining the most effective approach to regulate
agro-biotechnology because it is an interdisciplinary issue spanning “trade,
intellectual property, environment, health, and agriculture.”58 As a catch-all
issue, GM crops have become increasingly implicated in international trade
conflicts because in regulating agro-biotechnology, developing nations must
take into consideration economic development, food security, and
environmental protection—all against the backdrop of international trade
agreements.59 The following section describes how international and
national instruments attempt to regulate the environmental impacts of GM
crops.
A.

The Two Major International Biosafety Instruments Offer Different
Approaches to Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology

The two international treaties that regulate GM crops—the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety60 (“Cartagena Protocol”) and the World Trade
Organization’s (“WTO”) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”)—reflect different philosophical
approaches to regulating agro-biotechnology and exemplify the tensions that
make GM crops a controversial international trade issue.61
The Cartagena Protocol grew out of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (“CBD”).62 The CBD, which the Philippines has signed and
ratified,63 is a framework treaty that contains primarily aspirational
provisions regarding biodiversity. It includes generalized guidance on the
handling of biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits, directing the
parties to develop a protocol outlining procedures for the “safe transfer,
handling, and the use of any living modified organism resulting from
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
58

Murphy, supra note 6, at 139.
UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at iii.
60
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31.
61
The Philippines joined the WTO in 1995. WTO, Member Information: Philippines and the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/philippines_e.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
62
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 19, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf [hereinafter CBD].
63
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Biosafety Protocol,
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Parties to the
CBD/Cartagena Protocol].
59
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sustainable use of biological diversity.”64 Accordingly, a working group of
parties to the CBD spent the next several years negotiating such procedures,
resulting in a final version of the Cartagena Protocol in 2000.65
The Cartagena Protocol, which entered into force on September 11,
2003,66 provides a framework for ensuring protection of biological diversity
and human health from the potential risks posed by the international
movement and use of living modified organisms (“LMOs”).67 The
Philippines has signed, but not ratified, the Cartagena Protocol.68
Two of the key provisions in the Cartagena Protocol are the
“precautionary principle”69 and the concept of notice and consent through an
advanced informed agreement.70 The precautionary principle is an emerging
concept in international law that permits countries to take actions to prevent
harm to humans or the environment, even in the face of scientific
uncertainty.71 It reflects “international recognition of the need for and
legitimacy of applying precaution” in situations of low scientific certainty72
and places the burden of proving the safety of a new technology on the
producer of the technology, rather than on critics.73 The advanced informed
agreement requires exporters to seek consent from an importing country
before introducing LMOs into the environment.74

64

CBD, supra note 62, art. 19.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31.
66
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Status of Ratification and Entry into Force,
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
67
Notably, the Cartagena Protocol excludes living modified organism (“LMO”) commodities that
will be directly used as foods, feed or processing, LMOs in transit, and LMOs bound for contained use
(e.g., organisms intended for scientific research in a laboratory). IPGRI, supra note 38, at 72.
68
Parties to the CBD/Cartagena Protocol, supra note 63. The Philippines Constitution states that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the laws of the land.”
CONST. (1987) § 2, art. II, (Phil.). Treaties must receive a two-thirds approval vote from the Senate in
order to be valid and effective. Id. § 21, art. VII (Phil.).
69
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 31, pmbl.
70
Id. arts. 7-10.
71
See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Introduction to GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW xxxiii (Philippe Sands
ed., 1994); Schnier, supra note 45, at 412; Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment
on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 211
(2003).
72
Laurence Graff, The Precautionary Principle, in The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety:
Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development? 410 (Christoph Bail et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Reconciling Trade].
73
ALTIERI, supra note 2, at 55.
74
See, e.g., Elizabeth Duall, A Liability and Redress Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms
Under the Cartagena Protocol, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 182-85 (2004); de Leon et al., supra
note 27, at 10-11; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVT’L AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS,
FACT SHEET: CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, Mar. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2004/28621.htm.
65
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In contrast to the precautionary approach of the Cartagena Protocol,
the WTO’s SPS Agreement is a more substantial threshold because it relies
on the need for scientific proof in risk assessments.75 The SPS Agreement
focuses on preventing the misuse of phytosanitary regulations as a barrier to
trade.76 While it encourages members to be consistent with international
standards, it does allow higher phytosanitary standards if there is scientific
justification for the higher standard, which requires members to perform risk
assessments.77 Thus, the SPS Agreement “threatens to preclude developing
countries from banning or restricting the importation of genetically modified
seeds.”78 It does not single out GMOs as an item to be regulated, but if they
pose a scientifically-justified threat to biosafety in an importing country,
then the SPS Agreement would apply to any relevant national sanitary or
phytosanitary measures.79 Major exporters of GM crops, such as the United
States, Canada, and Argentina, apply conventional, science-based risk
assessments to GM products.80 In contrast, many European Union countries
have adopted a “no risk” approach, which entails strict import measures that
guarantee that importing countries maintain a high level of health and
environmental protection.81
A fundamental, philosophical conflict exists between the SPS
Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol.82 The SPS Agreement requires
scientific justification for imposing higher standards on imported items, such
as GM plant material, while the Cartagena Protocol only relies on the
precautionary principle, which does not require scientific justification.83
Further, the Cartagena Protocol takes socio-economic considerations into

75
Denise M. Lietz, Comment, A Precautionary Tale: The International Trade Implications of
Regulating Genetically Modified Foods in Australia and New Zealand, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 441,
423-24 (2001).
76
Phytosanitary regulations aim to: (1) protect agricultural crops from disease vectors such as
viruses, bacteria, and fungi, and (2) prevent alien invasive species from disrupting natural ecosystems.
Before the application of biotechnology to agricultural products, nations protected their crops from these
concerns with phytosanitary laws, which generally operate to reduce risks by regulating the transfer of
plant materials and imposing quarantines. IPGRI, supra note 38, at 69.
77
Anais K. Laidlaw, Is It Better to Be Safe than Sorry? The Cartagena Protocol Versus the World
Trade Organization, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 427, 446 (2005).
78
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal
Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 461 (2004).
79
Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. Legal Office, Law and Modern Biotechnology:
Selected Issues of Relevance to Food and Agriculture, FAO Legislative Study 78, at 36 (2003) (prepared
by Lyle Glowka) [hereinafter FAO Legal Office].
80
UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 4.
81
Id. at 7.
82
Laidlaw, supra note 77, at 466.
83
Id. at 423-24.
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account,84 while the SPS Agreement does not.85 The major GM exporting
countries have expressed apprehension that countries relying on the
precautionary principle will use socio-economic reasons to justify a ban on
GM products, an action that could lead to a trade conflict.86
B.

The Philippines Regulates GM Crops Through Executive and
Administrative Regulations

The Philippines’ rules and policies that specifically address the
potential effects of agro-biotechnology on the environment are: (1)
Executive Order No. 430,87 which created the National Committee on
Biosafety of the Philippines (“NCBP”), and (2) the Department of
Agriculture’s Administrative Order No. 8 (“Administrative Order No. 8”),
which is titled the “Rules and Regulations for the Importation and Release
into the Environment of Plants and Plant Products Derived from the Use of
Modern Biotechnology.”88
1.

The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines Provides
Technical Recommendations Regarding Biotechnology

The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (“NCBP”) is
a technical advisory body with a central role in regulating biotechnology.
Created in 1990 by Executive Order No. 430, the NCBP was the Philippine
government’s earliest effort to regulate biotechnology.89 The NCBP is a
multi-disciplinary, inter-agency body attached to the Philippine
government’s Department of Science and Technology.90 Its functions
include identifying potential hazards involved in genetic engineering
experiments, formulating and reviewing national policies and guidelines on
84
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biosafety and risk assessments, developing working arrangements with the
NCBP-member government agencies, developing technical expertise and
facilities, and holding public deliberations on proposed national policies.91
The NCBP is chaired by the Undersecretary for Research & Development of
the Department of Science and Technology, and is composed of: one
biological scientist, one environmental scientist, one physical scientist, one
social scientist, two “respected members of the community,” and one
representative each from the Departments of Agriculture, Environment and
Natural Resources, and Health.92
The NCBP has developed risk assessment guidelines for contained use
(laboratory or greenhouse use) and field tests of genetically modified plants.
The first version of the Philippine National Biosafety Guidelines was
published in 1991 and established that the NCBP must review and approve
any work covered by the Guidelines.93 In 1998, the NCBP released a second
edition of the Guidelines (“NCBP Guidelines”), which divided the
Guidelines into three monographs, one of which specifically addresses the
planned release of GMOs and potentially harmful exotic species.94 Under
these guidelines, all institutions engaged in genetic engineering must
establish an Institutional Biosafety Committee (“IBC”), which will evaluate
and monitor the biosafety aspects of their activities.95 An IBC must be
composed of at least five members, at least three of which must be
“scientist-members” and at least two of which must be “community
representatives” not affiliated with the institution.96
2.

The Philippine Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry
Regulates the Release of GM Crops

Regulatory authority over field release of GM crops is split between
the Philippine Department of Agriculture, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and the Department of Health.97 In 2002, the
Department of Agriculture promulgated Administrative Order No. 8,98 which
91
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requires a risk assessment before releasing any plant or plant products
derived from the use of modern biotechnology99 into the environment100 and
establishes guidelines for using GM crops for contained use, field testing,
propagation, and for feed, food, or processing. Administrative Order No. 8
also represents the Department of Agriculture’s attempt to conform to the
risk assessment principles in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.101
A sub-division of the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Plant
Industry (“BPI”), is responsible for acting on the risk assessment guidelines
outlined in Administrative Order No. 8. The BPI’s authority derives from
the Philippine Plant Quarantine Law of 1978,102 which includes a penalty
clause that subjects violators to fines not in excess of 20,000 pesos or
imprisonment or both.103 The BPI assures GM product safety through
review by its Scientific and Technical Research Panel, which conducts a risk
assessment prior to release of the product into the environment in order to
determine whether the product poses significant risks to human health and
the environment.104 If the regulated article passes the risk assessment, the
BPI issues a biosafety permit, which could be for (1) import for contained
use; (2) field testing; (3) propagation; or (4) import for direct use as food,
feed, or processing.105
IV.

THE PHILIPPINES’ EXISTING BIOSAFETY REGULATIONS LACK
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND FAIL TO COVER THE RANGE OF
PROBLEMS POSED BY GM CROPS

The Philippines currently relies on biosafety regulations and
guidelines that lack enforcement power and do not cover the range of
situations impacted by GM crops. These deficiencies demonstrate the
weakness of the Philippines’ existing biosafety regulatory framework.
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The Philippines’ Biosafety Regulations Lack Adequate Enforcement
Mechanisms

The Philippines’ existing regulatory regime for biosafety—the NCBP
Guidelines and Administrative Order No. 8—lacks enforcement power. As
an entity created by executive order rather than Congressional law, the
NCBP itself has no regulatory function. Acknowledging this limitation, the
NCBP “deems itself a technical evaluation body; it reviews proposals for
biotechnology application for the benefit of final approving bodies . . .”
(e.g., the Department of Agriculture for agro-biotechnology applications).106
The NCBP can impose sanctions and penalties for violators only through
existing rules and regulations in the relevant regulatory agencies.107 The
member agencies, in turn, do not have any laws or regulations that directly
address agro-biotechnology.108 Further, penalties for violations are weak.
For example, the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Plant Industry relies
on the Plant Quarantine Law of 1978109 to regulate the field release of
agricultural crops.110 The Plant Quarantine Law penalties include fines or
imprisonment, at the court’s discretion.111 The fine cannot exceed 20,000
pesos, which is only about US$370 and would not likely serve as a deterrent
to transnational corporations. The weak enforcement mechanisms and
penalties of the Philippines’ existing regulatory regime for biosafety make it
difficult for authorities to ensure GM crop cultivators are adequately
protecting the environment.
For each applicant who seeks to release GM crops into the
environment, the NCBP Guidelines require an Institutional Biosafety
Committee (“IBC”) to oversee compliance with the regulatory process.112
The NCBP developed the IBC concept as a way to retain NCBP oversight
over applicants in the face of limited NCBP funding.113 An IBC is
responsible for evaluating project proposals; supervising, monitoring and
reporting project progress to the NCBP; ensuring that the environment and
106
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human health are protected; and informing surrounding communities of
plans for environmental release of GM crops.114 Although an IBC has the
“power to draft rules and regulations” to supplement the 1998 NCBP
Guidelines,115 an IBC has no more enforcement authority than the NCBP, so
such rules would merely support the purely advisory powers of the NCBP.
Thus, any rules or regulations that an IBC develops would not provide
adequate deterrence against possible violators.
In a similar vein, although a majority of an IBC must endorse the
project to the NCBP,116 the NCBP itself has no authority to halt a project, so
the recommendations of an IBC are of little practical consequence. The
NCBP may withdraw its approval from a project,117 but it is the government
agency that granted any applicable permit or license, and not the NCBP, that
has the power to revoke the permit/license and destroy the GM crops.118
When enforcing Administrative Order No. 8, the BPI does not have
adequate regulatory authority to prevent violations. The penalties available
under Administrative Order No. 8 are revocation of the license or permit.119
Further, much of the monitoring and reporting is voluntary for both the BPI
and the parties growing GM crops.120 The BPI’s Plant Quarantine Officer
“may inspect at any time the site where the regulated article is field
tested,”121 but there are reports that such biosafety is not taken seriously122
and that inspections are rare.123
B.

The Absence of a Single Regulatory Body with Enforcement Authority
Hinders Compliance

Two of the most common approaches to regulating biotechnology are
to have specific legislation on GMOs or to expand the interpretation of
existing laws.124 Australia uses specific legislation, while the United States
uses administrative regulations adapted to address GMOs through existing
114
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laws. 125 The Philippines’ current regulatory framework contains elements of
both the United States and Australian approaches, but it should be remodeled
to more closely match the Australian model.
1.

The Current Structure of the Philippine Agencies with a Role in
Regulating GM Crops Impedes Compliance

Lack of a single regulatory body to regulate biotechnology in the
Philippines allows gaps in regulatory coverage and makes compliance
problematic. By cobbling together existing agencies to regulate the
environmental release of GM crops, the Philippines’ current biosafety
regulatory regime presents administrative challenges that leave many gaps in
coverage and results in a decreased likelihood of compliance with the NCBP
Guidelines. Given the interdisciplinary nature of genetic modification of
food products, it is inevitable that there will be jurisdictional overlap among
the agencies involved.
The sheer number of governmental agencies involved in attaining
approval to release a GM crop presents dramatic administrative and
coordination challenges. The Philippine Departments of Agriculture, Health,
Environment, Science and Technology, Trade and Industry, Economic
Planning, and Foreign Affairs all have a role in the oversight of issues
related to biosafety.126 Each department is composed of several bureaus,
many of which have a role in regulating agro-biotechnology. For example,
when Monsanto, a major transnational agricultural business based in the
United States, applied for a commercial permit for distribution of Bt corn,
the following agencies within the Department of Agriculture were involved:
the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Bureau of Animal Industry, the Bureau of
Agricultural and Fisheries Products Standards, and the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority.127 Under the NCBP Guidelines, the IBC for a project is
responsible for ensuring “that all relevant regulatory agencies have been
consulted” and that the “necessary permits, licenses or approvals have been
obtained before any planned release is made.”128 While Monsanto’s IBC
presumably fulfilled its duties, the regulatory structure unwisely relies on
IBCs to ensure that GM crop cultivators obtain all the necessary permits. As
discussed in Part IV.A, the NCBP Guidelines implemented by an IBC have

125
126
127

Id.
de Leon et al., supra note 27, at 10.
Louie Alonso Belmonte, Genetically Modified Food Requires Testing, MANILA TIMES, Sept. 12,

2005.
128

NCBP Guidelines, supra note 94, § 3.2.2(g).

JUNE 2006

GM CROPS IN THE PHILIPPINES

585

no enforcement authority other than that provided by the mandates of the
NCBP member agencies.
Another problem with regulating GM crops through a network of
existing agencies is that gaps in regulatory coverage will inevitably result. A
striking gap in the Philippines’ existing biosafety regulatory regime is that
there are no specific roles for the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the Department of Health to monitor impacts to the
environment and human health during field release of GM crops.129 The
NCBP Guidelines specify that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources is responsible for monitoring environmental impacts130 and that
the Department of Health is responsible for monitoring the effects on human
health,131 yet neither agency has regulatory authority or funding to conduct
such monitoring.132
Gaps in regulatory coverage are a particularly acute problem with
biotechnology, because technology develops faster than the laws governing
it. For example, the Philippines’ existing regulatory scheme for agrobiotechnology appears to have been designed only for situations in which
GM crops are grown for consumption. However, the “next wave” in agrobiotechnology is “biopharming,” which is the genetic engineering of plants
to grow pharmaceuticals, antibodies, and industrial enzymes.133
Biopharming poses more serious risks to human health and the environment
than crops intended for consumption.134 Consequently, regulation of
biopharming in the Philippines would require much more involvement from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department
of Health. The Department of Health would need to evaluate the adverse
health impacts that could result from human consumption of plants growing
biopharm products. However, the existing biosafety framework does not
provide for such extensive participation from the Department of Health. If
an organization intended to pursue biopharming in the Philippines, such gaps
in the regulatory regime would be exposed and could lead to harmful results.
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The Philippines’ Approach to Regulating Biotechnology Shares Key
Flaws with the United States’ Regulatory Framework and Should Be
Modified to More Closely Resemble the Australian Regulatory Model

The Australian “specific legislation” model for regulating
biotechnology is more effective than the “existing legislation” approach the
United States utilizes. The United States’ biotechnology regulatory
framework does not have a single regulatory authority with enforcement
authority,135 and simultaneously has been heavily criticized for its
ineffectiveness.136 In the United States, regulatory authority over GM crops
is shared mostly by three federal agencies, the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).137 In 1986, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy drafted the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology.138 This framework is based on the philosophy that GM crops
are substantially similar to conventional crops,139 and thus their safety can be
assured by existing regulations.140 Accordingly, the EPA and USDA are
involved before GM crops can be produced commercially, and thus regulate
the environmental release of plants derived from agro-biotechnology.141
Separate from the EPA and the USDA, the FDA regulatory authority only
applies to the marketing of GM crops as food for humans and animals.142
Each agency regulates under the authority of other relevant federal statutes,
each with its own mission and regulatory structure, none of which were
enacted to address biotechnology.143 The United States’ overlapping
approach has been criticized for being convoluted and ineffective.144
Relying on separate regulations for the agricultural and the environmental
aspects of biotechnology increases the complexity of the regulatory
systems145 and allows the agencies to divide regulation of GM crops in an
135
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illogical manner.146 In sum, despite the existence of the Coordinated
Framework to encourage coordination, the United States’ regulations have
proven to be under-inclusive.
In contrast, Australia has one agency that oversees all GMO-related
issues,147 an approach that is more efficient and comprehensive than the
United States’ system. The Australian Gene Technology Act consolidates all
regulation of GMOs and GM products and established the Office of the
Gene Technology Regulator (“OGTR”) to oversee implementation of the
law.148 The OGTR issues GMO licenses, prepares risk assessment and risk
management plans, develops policies and codes of practice, and provides
advice to the public, other regulatory agencies and the Ministerial
Council.149 The Gene Technology Act establishes a scientific committee, a
community committee, and an ethics committee to provide advice upon
request to the OGTR and Ministerial Council.150 Funneling all regulatory
functions through the OGTR decreases potential problems regarding
coordination and confusing overlaps in jurisdiction.
The Philippines’ NCBP is a step toward having a centralized regulator
like the Australian OGTR, but the current Philippine administrative
framework is too weak to be effective because the NCBP lacks enforcement
authority over the agencies with legal authority over biotechnology matters.
Such reliance on existing authority to regulate biotechnology is similar to the
United States’ system, and should be strengthened.
V.

STRONG BIOSAFETY LAWS WILL ENABLE THE PHILIPPINES TO BETTER
PROTECT ITS ENVIRONMENT FROM THE DANGERS POSED BY GM CROPS

The Philippines should strengthen its domestic biosafety laws in order
to better protect the environment from transgenes that could escape from
GM crops. Legislation from the Philippine Congress is necessary to provide
the adequate enforcement authority and funding to the agencies that must
implement biosafety laws. Such legal authority would bring the Philippines
into compliance with the Cartagena Protocol, although the country may not
benefit by formally ratifying the Protocol due to the potential adverse effects
on trade and economic issues.
146
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The Philippines Should Enact Congressional Legislation to Centralize
and Strengthen Enforcement for Regulation of GM Crops

As a long-term strategy, the Philippines should enact legislation that
centralizes and strengthens regulatory authority over GM crops. A statutory
mandate in the form of a Republic Act (Philippine Congressional legislation)
is necessary in order to provide enforcement power and funding for the
agencies tasked with regulating GM crops.
As an initial matter, enacting congressional legislation specific to
biosafety—rather than regulating through existing authority—represents
tacit acceptance of the philosophy that products of biotechnology should be
regulated differently than identical products created through conventional
means.151 Although some biotechnological processes alter genomes in ways
that could have occurred without biotechnology,152 it is only the applications
that could not have occurred naturally that warrant specialized legislation.153
However, because this distinction would be burdensome to assess in
practical applications, regulation of crops created through genetic
modifications will necessarily be over-inclusive.
A centralized agency with enforcement authority over biosafety would
minimize gaps in regulatory coverage and increase compliance. The
Philippines already has a central biosafety entity—the National Committee
on Biosafety of the Philippines—but as discussed supra in Part IV.B, the
NCBP has only advisory authority. Currently the NCBP merely indicates its
approval of a project; bestowing actual permit-issuing authority would give
its assessments more weight. The NCBP should also have the power to halt
projects.
One gap that should be closed is the possibility that a thorough
analysis of environmental impacts will not be taken prior to field release of
GM crops. In the United States, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service rarely requires preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement prior to approving a biopharm field,154
indicative of the regulatory gap critics have identified regarding
environmental impacts of biopharming.155 Analogously, there is currently no
151
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regulatory trigger for the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (“DENR”) to conduct an environmental impact assessment for the
field release of GM crops.156 The NCBP Guidelines establish that DENR
“shall be responsible for monitoring the environmental effects of the planned
release.”157 However, DENR itself has no explicit mandate to be involved
with GM crops,158 as crops are deemed to be an agricultural issue within the
purview of the Department of Agriculture.159 A related assurance that
environmental impacts were being adequately addressed could be provided
by more robust public participation requirements, which could be enforced
by a central agency but performed at the local level. Public participation
supported by the threat of penalty would be an improvement over the
minimum requirements currently dictated by the NCBP Guidelines and
Administrative Order No. 8.160
To improve the likelihood of compliance, the legislation should
include stricter penalties than merely revoking a permit or license. Lessons
from countries, such as the United States, that have been growing GM crops
for longer than the Philippines reveal the flaws of relying on voluntary
compliance.161
Inclusion of a provision in the biosafety legislation establishing
liability for environmental harms is unnecessary and would drastically
reduce the likelihood of the legislation’s enactment. Given the Philippine
Congress’ reluctance to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, it is doubtful it would
pass any laws establishing liability for environmental harms caused by GM
crops. Countries with well-established GM crop sectors, such as the United
States, rely on common law civil liability to remedy harms.162 Legal
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theories that might apply include negligence, negligence per se, strict
liability in tort, trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance.163
B.

The Factors For and Against Philippine Ratification of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety Balance Each Other

The Philippines is under pressure from international and domestic
forces to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, but on balance, the
considerations supporting and opposing ratification are roughly equal.
Enacting domestic biosafety legislation is the most important action the
Philippines should take to protect its environment from the potential dangers
of GM crops. Doing so will bring the Philippines closer into compliance
with the Cartagena Protocol, but not threaten the foreign trade or investment
interests that the Philippines depends on to improve its national economy.
A factor supporting ratification of the Cartagena Protocol is the
likelihood that doing so would help the Philippines strengthen human and
institutional capacities in biosafety. Article 22 of the Protocol describes the
methods through which parties can improve their capacity.164 Capacitybuilding is an important aspect of improving compliance, as penalties cannot
be imposed unless the implementing agency has the capacity to discover
violations and enforce fines.165
Further, the Philippines already appears to partially support the
Cartagena Protocol. During negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol, the
Philippines belonged to the “Like-Minded Group” negotiating bloc, which
comprised most of the developing countries.166 The Like-Minded Group
sought a broad scope for the Cartagena Protocol and wanted it to supersede
other international agreements.167
They were also concerned that
“unregulated use of GMOs would threaten the sustainable use of their
biodiversity.”168 In addition, the Philippines’ executive agencies claim that
the existing Philippine biosafety guidelines are consistent with the risk
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assessment procedure provided in the Cartagena Protocol169 (although
statements from agency officials indicate that in practice the agencies act on
science-based risk assessment principles,170 more similar to the SPS
Agreement). The government has stated that it believes GM crops to be
safe,171 thus not requiring additional regulation.
On the other hand, the Philippines faces the possibility that ratification
of the Cartagena Protocol may jeopardize economic development
opportunities from international corporations.172 A key factor is that the
United States, the Philippines’ most important trading partner, is not bound
by the Cartagena Protocol;173 this is very likely a contributing reason why
the Philippine Senate has not yet ratified the Protocol. In addition, it does
not seem likely that the Philippines will ratify the Cartagena Protocol in the
near future.174 There are reports that the Philippines’ Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs has not yet deliberated on the Protocol’s ratification175 and
that the Chairman of the Philippine Senate Committee on Agriculture
believes the Philippines should not ratify the Cartagena Protocol because the
United States has not done so.176
Understandably, the Philippine government’s priority is economic
development and it is unlikely to take any actions that might threaten
international investment in the Philippine economy.177 The government
views GM crops as an approach to improving domestic food security and the
livelihoods of farmers.178 However, in setting domestic policies regarding
the regulation of agro-biotechnology, the Philippines, like many other
169
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developing countries, is heavily influenced by its foreign trading partners.179
The United States, in particular, wields significant influence on the
Philippines. From 1898 until 1946, the United States controlled the
Philippines, and subsequently the countries maintained close economic
ties.180 Today, the United States makes its wishes known on the economic
front, as it is the Philippines’ most important trading partner and largest
foreign investor.181 In turn, the United States is the Philippines’ top export
market; approximately one-third of all Philippine exports are to the United
States.182 Further, the United States is the world’s most significant exporter
of GM crops (accounting for 59% of the global production), and in 2004, the
Philippines was the United States’ 16th largest export market for agricultural
products.183 Thus, the United States has an economic interest in ensuring the
openness of markets for its agricultural products, which increasingly
comprise GM foods, and the Philippines is one of those markets. From the
Philippines’ perspective as a net importer of grains,184 it is reluctant to
alienate its trading partners that supply those grains. The Philippines is also
reluctant to jeopardize international investment,185 as the nation faces
significant domestic economic challenges, including a national debt
constituting 78% of the GDP.186 The government is attempting to increase
revenue, but domestic political uncertainty has hampered those efforts,
resulting in one of the lowest economic growth rates in the region and
decreases in foreign investment.187 The Philippines is pursuing Bt corn to
meet the shortfall in corn and corn substitutes, which the Philippine feed
industry depends on.188 Thus, the Philippines has compelling economic
reasons for following the United States’ lead on GM policies.
However, the Philippines has other trading partners as well, many of
which are parties to the Cartagena Protocol. As of April 2, 2006, 132

179

UNCTAD GMO Trade Study, supra note 1, at 45.
Scalise & Guzman, supra note 177, at 146.
181
Thomas Hubbart, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State, Speech to Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, U.S.-Philippine Relations: Opportunities to Enhance Our Enduring Partnership (Mar. 6, 2001),
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2001/1129.htm.
182
Id.
183
CORPUZ, supra note 24.
184
FAO, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE INDICATORS, supra note 26.
185
See Lawmakers, Scientists Bat for Legislation on Biotechnology, supra note 28.
186
Carlos H. Conde, Philippines Pinching Pesos to Fight a Huge and Worsening Deficit, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2004, § A.
187
Carlos H. Conde, 6% Growth Surprises Government in Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, §
W.
188
Lorenzo, supra note 178.
180

JUNE 2006

GM CROPS IN THE PHILIPPINES

593

countries were parties to the Protocol,189 including many of the United
States’ current trading partners. The Protocol states that trade of living
modified organisms between parties and non-parties must be consistent with
the Protocol.190 The United States Department of State acknowledges that
non-parties who wish to export to parties must abide by the importing
country’s domestic regulations191 and the United States purports to be
support practical and effective implementation of the Cartagena Protocol.192
There is strength in numbers and the more countries that accede to the
Protocol, the closer the international community will be to having binding
standards for minimizing the environmental risks posed by GM crops.193
Harmonization over standards and terms in legislation is an important step in
resolving potential trade disputes.194
In analyzing whether the Philippines should ratify the Cartagena
Protocol, it would be helpful to examine the economic ramifications of other
developing nations and island countries in the Pacific Rim with economic
similarities to the Philippines that have either signed or not signed the
Cartagena Protocol. However, given the Philippines’ colonial history with
Spain and later the United States, the Philippines is unique. It is also too
early to see economic ramifications of other countries’ decisions regarding
the Cartagena Protocol, as the Protocol entered into force so recently (in
2003). Yet, Thailand’s experience with GM crops may be instructive. In
2005, Monsanto threatened to halt its GM corn production in Thailand
unless the Thai government lifted its ban on open field trials and the
commercialization of transgenic crops.195 Thailand is a party to the
Cartagena Protocol, and this incident reveals that taking too cautious a
stance on GM crops can jeopardize foreign investment.
The precautionary principle, a critical feature of the Cartagena
Protocol, has resulted in an unexpected phenomenon among many
developing countries’ policies regarding GM crops.196 Given the lower
priority developing countries usually assign to environmental protection and
189
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their simultaneous need to increase food production, one would expect
developing countries to have relatively permissive biosafety policies, but
that is not the case.197 Professor Robert Paarlberg has attributed the cautious
GM crop policies in developing countries to an array of international
influences, including non-governmental organizations from industrial
countries objecting to GM crops as part of an agenda against globalization
and the prospect of consumer skepticism toward GM crops in export markets
in other countries.198 He further attributes cautious GM crop policies to the
Cartagena Protocol, which encourages caution on biosafety approvals and
“implicitly likens the transboundary shipment of GM organisms to the
international shipment of hazardous waste.”199 Other critics of the
precautionary principle observe that it does not consider the benefits of a
complete array of risks, thus rendering incomplete the comparison between
the new technology and the current practice.200 In so doing, the
precautionary principle prevents a technology from steadily progressing
toward the reduction of risks by halting it if the first uses of the technology
are “not perfect.”201 Since the Philippines is pursuing GM crops to benefit
national food security, an overly cautious policy regarding biosafety may
delay the expected benefits of GM crop technology, thus defeating the
purpose.
C.

The Philippines Should Adopt the Draft National Biosafety
Framework As a Temporary Measure to Improve Biosafety

The Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau of the Philippines’
Department of Environment and Natural Resources has drafted a National
Biosafety Framework (“Draft Framework”)202 that would improve
environmental protection by increasing coordination between the agencies
that regulate GM crops. With the assistance of the United Nations
Environment Programme, the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau
197
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conducted a multi-year project to determine how the Philippines could best
prepare to conform its domestic laws with the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety203 should the nation choose to ratify the Protocol.204 The end
product was a draft Executive Order prescribing guidelines for the
implementation of the Framework and strengthening the NCBP.205
The Draft Framework consolidates existing “policies, laws, and
administrative issues related to modern biotechnology and biosafety” into an
integrated framework that increases “clarity, transparency, and predictability
[in] decision-making,” seeks to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, and facilitates
public consensus.206 For instance, the Draft Framework lays out which
administrative agency shall take the lead on enumerated GMO scenarios and
it also directs the NCBP to designate an agency when a GMO does not fall
under the jurisdiction of one of the enumerated agencies.207 Further, it seeks
to ensure that agencies other than the Department of Agriculture also
participate in monitoring and enforcement when necessary; the Framework
proposes to accomplish this by attaching monitoring conditions to approvals
and authorizations.208
The Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community
Empowerment (“SEARICE”), a non-profit group based in the Philippines,
has criticized the Draft Framework for not designating the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources as the sole lead agency responsible for
implementation of the Draft Framework. SEARICE recommends that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources manage the Draft
Framework, since it is already the lead agency for the Convention on
Biodiversity.209 SEARICE also argues that the Framework does not resolve
the problems in administrative efficiency and flexibility inherent in the
existing biosafety regulations, noting that coordination between the NCBP
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and the Bureau of Plant Industry (“BPI”) is particularly troublesome.210
However, it is unclear why coordination between the NCBP and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources would be smoother. The
NCBP is better situated to coordinate the regulatory agencies. It occupies a
more independent position as it is attached to the Department of Science and
Technology. Further, retaining the BPI in an important role makes sense
because, as a bureau within the Philippine Department of Agriculture, it is
better equipped to balance hypothetical biosafety risks from GM crops
against the Philippines’ actual food production needs.211
The drafters of the Draft Framework correctly acknowledge its
limitations as a long-term solution.212 However, despite the criticisms from
SEARICE, the Draft Framework is worth implementing for the clarification
it provides regarding the roles of the various administrative agencies in
regulating agro-biotechnology, which helps fill some of the gaps left by the
existing regulatory regime.
D.

Enacting Stronger Biosafety Laws Would Contribute to Building
Public Support for GM Crops

Ensuring strong environmental protection is one aspect of improving
public confidence in GM crops, which are currently beleaguered by volatile
protests.
Further, increasing public confidence in the Philippine
government’s ability to regulate the environmental impacts of GM crops is
an important step toward building the acceptance GM crops need in order to
have any kind of impact on food security, which is the Philippine
government’s purpose for embracing the technology.
There are groups that oppose GM crops for reasons other than their
potential to disrupt ecosystems through the flow of transgenes.213 Several
farmers’ groups and non-governmental organizations do not want the
Philippines to become dependent on foreign transnational companies for
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seeds and other agricultural needs.214 Improving environmental protection
would do little to sway these groups that GM crops should be embraced.
However, public opinion polls indicate that the majority of consumers in
Asia are open-minded, albeit cautious, about GM crops.215 A precautionary
approach to regulating GM crops would appeal to those populations who
might otherwise support GM crops. Commentators have noted that with the
introduction of new technologies, “low-certainty, low-consensus” risk
situations can be expected, but as time passes those situations have the
potential to move into higher levels of consensus.216 In low-certainty, lowconsensus situations, public input “assumes even greater social and scientific
importance.”217
A challenge in building public approval of GM crops is that a public
relations battle is being fought by both sides. An infamous example is how
frequently anti-GMO groups cite the 2000 discovery of transgenes from GM
maize in the genomes of traditional maize varieties in Mexico. However, the
scientific method from the original test was suspect, and when the
confirming survey was conducted in 2004, the scientists found no
transgenes.218 Within the Philippines, there have been conflicting reports
about the success of Bt corn.219 The Philippine government frequently touts
Bt corn as an example of how the existing biosafety guidelines are
functioning properly. However, even if Bt corn is safe, that does not mean
all GM crops in the future will be. Each genetic transformation event and
each modified species will behave differently in the field.220 Thus, it is
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crucial to have reliable biosafety procedures in place to properly address
future unknowns.
It should be noted that biosafety regulations should not be
strengthened merely to improve public confidence.221 One side-effect of
over-regulation is that only large multi-national growers will be able to
afford the cost of complying, which could contribute to the current trend of
consolidating control of agriculture into corporate hands.222
VI.

CONCLUSION

The potential benefits of GM crops, such as the possibility of
increased yield and reduced use of pesticides, make the technology
worthwhile to pursue, albeit with caution. Although there are still protests of
GM crops and there may be compelling social or economic reasons not to
pursue the technology, from the scientific perspective regarding
environmental risks from gene flow from GM crops, proceeding with
caution and adhering to a comprehensive, enforceable legal regime is the
best approach. The Philippines’s existing agro-biotechnology regulations
are weak, but would be improved by adopting the temporary fix
encompassed in the Draft Biosafety Framework and, most importantly,
binding legislation in the form of a Republic Act.
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